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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner
v.
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L.
HENRIOD,
Respondent,

CaseNo.20050311-SC

GREG JONAS,
Real Party in Interest.

REPLY BRIEF
Point I
This Court should apply the plain language of rule 65B where, as
here, the Legislature has not barred "judicial review" of the
challenged order.
Defendant's Brief of Real Party in Interest confuses (1) defendant's preferred
writ standard with "this Court's constitutional power to issue extraordinary writs,"
(2) judicial review with appellate review, and (3) appellate review with
extraordinary relief. Br. R.P.I. at 11-12.
A.

Nothing in Article 8, section 3 of the Utah Constitution prohibits
Rule 65B(d)(2)'s "abuse of discretion" standard.

Defendant does not deny that rule Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2) refers only to a
simple abuse of discretion, but he suggests that applying the rule as written
"expands the jurisdiction of this Court beyond its legislatively defined appellate

jurisdiction and its constitutionally mandated extraordinary writ jurisdiction." Br.
R.P.I. at 12. "Because the state has pointed to no provision which allows this Court
to expand its own jurisdiction by rule," defendant continues, "the state's argument
that Rule 65B somehow expands this Court's jurisdiction beyond its jurisdiction to
issue common law extraordinary writs must be rejected." Id.
The State has never argued "that Rule 65B somehow expands this Court's
jurisdiction" beyond the powers granted by the Utah Constitution. Id. This Court's
jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is bestowed by the Utah Constitution:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute,
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause.
Utah Const., art. 8, § 3. This provision does not adopt defendant's preferred writ
standard, limiting the Court's writ jurisdiction to circumstances "where there is a
gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are
flouted ..." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677,683-84 (Utah 1995). The
Constitution does not specify what standards apply in the various writ contexts.
Defendant's reliance on "the traditional limits on extraordinary relief" as set
forth by the United States Supreme Court and courts in Washington, Idaho, Hawaii,
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and Nevada, is equally unavailing. Br. R.P.I, at 12-14. These courts do not define
the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court.
Moreover, the "traditional" rule in Utah is the abuse of discretion standard
found in rule 65B(d)(2). Defendant concedes that "at least one" of this Court's prior
decisions "arguably suggests" that a "simple abuse of discretion standard can be
applied in deciding whether to issue an extraordinary writ." Br. R.P.I, at 15 (citing
Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44, Tf 12). In fact, excluding Board of Pardons cases, not at
least one, but virtually every one of this Court's rule 65B(d) decisions has applied the
rule-based abuse of discretion standard. See Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice,
2003 UT 15, If 29, 70 P.3d 58 (denying relief on the ground that no Utah court
exercised personal jurisdiction over Osborne or "abused its discretion'") (quoting
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A)); Kawamoto v. Fratto, 2000 UT 6, | 7, 994 P.2d 187
("Specifically, we review the first and second issues to determine whether the
'inferior court . . . has . . . abused its discretion.'") (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(d)(2)(A)); Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927,929 (Utah 1998) (concluding that
an "abuse of discretion standard" applies to extraordinary writ proceedings in the
nature of mandamus); cf. Burke, 2005 UT 44, ^f 14 (denying writ without resolving
the standard).

3

Defendant asserts that this Court in Burke "seemed to acknowledge that a gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion is required when the legislature has precluded
appellate review/7 Br. R.P.L at 16. On the contrary, in Burke this Court meticulously
avoided adopting either standard, concluding that "we have no need to resolve the
lingering uncertainty as to the proper standard to apply in the extraordinary writ
context because we conclude that the district court acted within the bounds of its
discretion." Burke, 2005 UT 44, \ 14. Since the lower court did not abuse its
discretion, a fortiori it did not grossly and flagrantly abuse its discretion. Id.
Defendant claims that this Court in Burke endorsed his position, whereas the
Court was merely describing a position espoused by one of the litigants. Defendant
writes, "In fact, both this Court and the respondent recognized that a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion standard is required when the legislature has set limits on
appellate review because if a simple abuse of discretion standard were used it
'would allow parties to essentially circumvent statutory limitations on appellate
review/" Br. R.P.L at 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Burke, 2005 UT 44, \ 13). This
Court in fact stated, "According to TDC, we applied the gross and flagrant abuse
standard in Renn not simply because extraordinary relief was sought, but due to our
concern that use of the garden variety abuse of discretion standard in such situations
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would allow parties to essentially circumvent statutory limitations on appellate
review/7 Burke, 2005 UT 44, U13 (emphasis added).
The most defendant can claim is that this Court has expressed doubt whether
the standard it has applied in the past is the correct one. See, e.g., Utah County v.
Alexanderson, 2005 UT 67, \ 4 (stating that the Court granted certiorari "to review
whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard in conducting its rule 65B
review/' but denying relief because the petitioner had a right to appeal).
Certainly nothing in the Utah Constitution or traditional practice requires this
Court to depart from the abuse of discretion standard it adopted in rule 65B(d) and
has applied in numerous cases.
B. The flagrant abuse standard applies where the Legislature
attempts to insulate an administrative order from judicial review,
not where it merely fails to provide an appellate remedy.
Defendant contends that the State must demonstrate a gross and flagrant abuse
of discretion where the legislature has "abrogated the right to appear or "precluded
appellate review/7 Br. R.P.1. at 16,19. This argument confuses appellate review with
judicial review.
This Court has applied the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard only
twice, both times to circumvent a statute seeking to place orders of the Board of
Pardons beyond the reach of judicial review. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 683-84; Petersen
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v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151-52 (Utah 1995). The statute in question
declared that decisions of the Board "are final and are not subject to judicial review/7
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (West 2004). This language can only be read as an
attempt to prohibit all judicial review, whether by writ, appeal, or original action in
the district court. Id. Insulating an administrative order from judicial review is
more sweeping and different in kind from merely not providing an avenue to appeal
an order from one court to another.
In Petersen, this Court recognized the difference between the Legislature's
"refus[ing] to provide a statutory appeal from orders of a governmental agency"
and the Legislature's attempting to "curtail the constitutional powers of this Court
to issue extraordinary writs in appropriate circumstances." Petersen, 907 P.2d at
1152. In the latter circumstance, "where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving
appropriate deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of
the Board of Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate
extraordinary writ." Renn, 904 P.2d at 683-84. In order words, where the Legislature
attempts to foreclose all judicial review, this Court retains the constitutional
prerogative to act, but only to correct a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
flouting fundamental fairness.
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That is not the situation here. In the criminal appeals statute, the Legislature
merely "refused to provide a statutory appear from one court to another. Petersen,
907 P.2d at 1152. It did not attempt to insulate an order from all judicial review.
Consequently, the instant case does not require invocation of the higher standard.
Moreover, the Legislature "is presumed [to be] aware of the legal context in
which it acts." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 R2d 1167,1169 (Utah 1991)
(citing Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281,1284-85 (Utah 1987)). It thus
presumably understood that limiting the types of appeals the prosecution could
bring would satisfy the first prerequisite for extraordinary relief, the absence of a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
C. The instant writ is not the equivalent of appellate review because
relief is a matter of discretion, not of rightDefendant contends that to permit review under rule 65B/s abuse of discretion
standard would in effect convert writ proceedings into simple appeals and thereby
abolish statutory limits on the State's right to appeal. See Br. R.P.L at 18-20. This
argument confuses appellate review with extraordinary writ proceedings.
Whatever standard is employed, an extraordinary writ proceeding is not simply
an appeal by another name. One who appeals from a final, appealable order has,
upon demonstrating reversible error, a "right to relief." Davidsen v. Salt Lake City,
95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374,377 (Utah 1938). Similarly, a party seeking appeal of an
7

interlocutory order must petition the appellate court to take the appeal, but once it
does so, the appellant, has, upon demonstrating reversible error, a "right to relief/7
Id.
In contrast, no one has a right to extraordinary relief. The decision to grant or
deny an extraordinary writ "is always a matter of discretion with this court and
never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant/7 State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216,
429 P.2d 969,971 (1967) (referring to writ of mandamus). See also Bernat v. Allphin,
2005 UT 1,1| 5,106 P.3d 707 (citing Ruggeri); L.J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. Crockett, 63
Utah 479, 227 P. 270, 272 (Utah 1924) (stating that granting a writ of mandamus is
"largely a matter of discretion"). Consistent with this view, the controlling rule uses
discretionary language, stating that appropriate relief "may be granted" where an
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(d)(2).
In an appeal, this Court lacks discretion to deny relief upon a showing that the
lower court has committed reversible error. However, the Court may deny an
extraordinary writ even where it recognizes that the lower court has committed
error, just as it may deny certiorari review even where it recognizes that the court
of appeals has committed error. Extraordinary relief lies solely within the Court's
discretion.
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Accordingly, "[o]ne of the special advantages of review by extraordinary writ
is that it is possible to respond to a perceived need to provide occasional appellate
guidance on matters that often elude ordinary appeal, without establishing rules of
appealability that will bring a flood of less important appeals in their wake/7
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris.2d § 3934.1 (1996).
Point II
Until the Supreme Court overrules Maryland v. Craig, lower courts
have no discretion to depart from it
Defendant contends that the district court here not only did not commit a gross
and flagrant abuse of discretion, or even a simple abuse of discretion, but "correctly
concluded that Crawford controls and requires that the core confrontation protection
cannot be dispensed with based upon a trial court's finding of reliability/7 Br. R.P.I.
at 21 (underlining and capitalization omitted).
A.

No court has ever ruled that Crawford overruled Craig, but state
and federal courts continue to cite and apply Craig.

Defendant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision in "Craig was
abrogated by the high court's recent decision in Crawford/' Br. R.P.I, at 21.
In support of his contention, defendant notes that "the state has not cited any
cases in which a court has concluded that Crawford did not overrule Craig/7 Br. R.P.L
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at 41. This is true. The State is not aware of any case stating that Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), did not overrule Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990). In fact, the State is not aware of any case even discussing the possibility.
Cases uniformly continue to treat Craig as good law.
For example, United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2005), was decided
after the State filed its opening brief. Kappell appealed a jury conviction for
multiple counts of child sexual abuse. Id. at 552. The children testified at trial. Id.
at 553. The trial court found that the children feared Kappell and "would suffer
emotional trauma from testifying in open court in the presence of [Kappell]/' Id.
Accordingly, "they testified in a room outside the courtroom and the jury viewed
their testimony over closed-circuit television monitors/' Id. Because Kappell did not
object to this procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
analyzed his Confrontation Clause claim under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 554.
It found no plain error. Id.
The court analyzed the issue under Craig. It concluded that "[n]othing in
Kappell's trial violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause." Id. "He was
able to, and did, confront all of the witnesses against him. The children gave direct
testimony and he cross-examined them." Id. The court continued, "Although the
children testified not in the courtroom but in another room and their testimony was
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viewed on closed circuit television, Kappell acquiesced in that arrangement/' Id.
In support of its holding, the Sixth Circuit cited Craig:
Cf Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,840-60,110 S. Ct. 3157,11L. Ed.2d 666
(1990) (holding that a state statutory procedure that permitted "a child
witness who is alleged to be the victim of child abuse" to testify against the
alleged perpetrator by one-way closed circuit television did not
categorically violate the Confrontation Clause).
Id.
Kappell argued "that under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford,
the trial in his case denied him his right to confrontation." Id. "That argument," the
Sixth Circuit declared, "rests upon a misinterpretation of Crawford/' Id. Crawford
"involved the admissibility under the Confrontation Clause of recorded testimonial
statements of a person who did not testify at the trial." Id. at 555. "The holding in
Crawford was that such statements, regardless of their reliability, are not admissible
unless the defendant was able to cross-examine their maker." Id. However," [i]n the
present case, in sharp contrast, the two witnesses (the children) did testify and were
cross-examined." Id. The Sixth Circuit never suggested the Crawford had overruled
Craig.

Romero v. State, - S.W.3d - , 2005 WL 2441921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), was
decided after defendant filed his brief. The question before the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals was whether Romero's right to be confronted with the witnesses
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against him was violated when a witness testified in disguise. Id. at *1. The majority
did not cite Crawford, but analyzed the issue under Craig. Reasoning that "[c] aiming
an adult witness's fears is quite a different thing from protecting a child victim from
serious emotional trauma/' the court found a Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at
*3. Two judges dissented, also analyzing the issue under Craig. See id. at *4-*6. No
one suggested the Craig had been overruled. See also United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d
1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that Craig was violated when adult witnesses testified
by two-way video teleconference from Australia), vacated and en banc rehearing
ordered, 404 F.3d 1291.
Defendant sees support for his position that Crawford overruled Craig in State
v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 320 (Md. App. 2005), a case cited in the State's opening
brief. See Br. R.P.I, at 43-44. Snowden involved child victims, but the children did not
testify at trial via closed circuit television or any other method. Snowden, 867 A.2d
at 319. The issue on appeal was whether their out-of-court statements were
testimonial. Id. at 325. Thus, the holding of Craig was not at issue in that case. The
State cited it merely to demonstrate that courts continue to cite Craig without stating
that the case was overruled.
Unable to find any passage in Snowden stating that Crawford overruled Craig,
defendant nevertheless argues that "the court's final reference to Craig, apparently
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overlooked by the state when it chose Snowden to support its argument, suggests
that the Snowden court did not think that Craig survived Crawford because the
Confrontation Clause guarantees face to face confrontation/' Br. R.P.L at 43-44.
What defendant calls the court's "final reference" to Craig was in fact not its
final reference. The court's final reference to Craig establishes beyond cavil that the
Snowden court viewed Craig as good law:
Amicus's argument that children must be treated differently in the court
system generally only becomes relevant once the prosecution decides to
call the children to the stand to testify. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,110
S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed.2d 666 (1990). In determining the testimonial quality
of a statement, however, it is the circumstances of the statement that is
paramount, and not necessarily the nature of some inherent characteristic
of the declarant.
Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329, n.20. The court's point is that Craig is not relevant to
determine whether a child's out-of-court statement is testimonial, but is relevant
where the prosecution decides to call the child as a witness. Obviously, if Craig had
been overruled, it would not be relevant to that or any other inquiry.
Although defendant labels Craig "antiquated," he is unable to cite any case, and
the State is aware of none, stating that it has been overruled. Br. R.P.L at 21. On the
contrary, courts continue to treat Craig as good law.
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B.

Crawford does not address the question presented by the instant
case.

Defendant asserts that "Crawford makes it clear not only that the reliability test
of Roberts is overruled, but also that the explicit language mandating face to face
confrontation defines the nature of the right..." Br. R.P.I, at 29.
Of course, the Sixth Amendment contains no "explicit language" mandating
face-to-face confrontation; it guarantees merely that an accused be "confronted
with" the witnesses against him. That defendant refers repeatedly to "face to face
confrontation" is tacitly acknowledgment that "confrontation" alone is not explicit
on this point. As the Court stated in Craig, "Given our hearsay cases, the word
'confronted,' as used in the Confrontation Clause, cannot simply mean face-to-face
confrontation . . . " Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
More to the point, to read Crawford as holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires physical confrontation is to misread Crawford. That issue was not before the
Court in that case. In Crawford, the trial court admitted a tape recording of a
statement Crawford's wife had made to police. See id. at 40. The wife did not testify.
Id. Because she did not testify, she was not subjected to confrontation by any
definition. The Crawford Court was not presented with, and did not purport to
decide, the question of whether confrontation by closed-circuit television in a child
abuse case can satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
14

Moreover, the touchstone of confrontation for Crawford is cross-examination,
not facing one's accuser. The majority opinion refers to cross-examination 41 times.
See id. at 38-68. In contrast, it refers to facing one's accuser only four times, three of
which are descriptions of pre-revolutionary English practice. See Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 43,44,57. Even the pages of the opinion defendant cites for the proposition that
"Crawford makes it clear . . . that the explicit language mandating face to face
confrontation defines the nature of the right/' Br. R.P.I, at 29 (citing Crawford, 541
U.S. at 67-68), contain no reference to face-to-face confrontation. They do, however,
refer to cross-examination three times. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. In fact, that
portion of the opinion comes close to equating confrontation with crossexamination:
In this case, the State admitted Sylvia's testimonial statement against
petitioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine
her. That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Roberts notwithstanding, we decline to mine the record in
search of indicia of reliability. Where testimonial statements are at issue,
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands
is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
It is risky to read too much into these references. The Crawford Court was not
concerned with whether granting a defendant the "full opportunity for
contemporaneous cross-examination/' and permitting the judge, jury, and
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defendant to view the witness by video monitor is "functionally equivalent" to "live,
in-person testimony." Craig, 497 U.S. at 851. That was the issue in Craig, and is the
issue here.
C.

Craig's primary rationale is the protection of child abuse victims
from trauma, not the admission of reliable testimony.

Defendant contends that Craig did not survive Crawford because "[e]ven the
most superficial reading of Craig demonstrates that its holding... was based on the
reliability rationale of Roberts [v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)]." Br. R.P.I. at 33.
On the contrary, a thoughtful reading of Maryland v. Craig demonstrates that
it is not simply another application of the reliability test announced in Ohio v.
Roberts. Although the Craig Court would undoubtedly not have approved what it
believed was an unreliable procedure, the driving force behind the opinion was not
reliability, but the protection of child witnesses.
The Court was willing to carve out an exception to face-to-face confrontation
only where doing so "is necessary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
The Court declared that "'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling one/" Id. at 852 (quoting Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). In fact,
the Court had recently upheld a state statute that proscribed the possession and
16

viewing of child pornography on the ground that "a State's interest in 'safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling/" Id. at 852-53
(quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,109 (1990)). Similarly, "a State's interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her
accusers in court." Id. at 853. The Court thus held that, where the State makes an
adequate showing of necessity, "the state interest in protecting child witnesses from
the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case" is "sufficiently important to justify the
use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial
against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant."
Id. at 855.
The primary rationale for Craig's holding, therefore, was the protection of child
victims from further trauma. Obviously, the Court was not going to permit such
testimony if it was unreliable; the Roberts reliability test was prevailing law in 1990,
when Craig was decided. And Craig recognizes that minimizing the trauma
experienced by a child witness will at least protect, if not enhance, the reliability of
that testimony. Id. at 856-57. But the "necessity" the Court identified as justifying
an exception to the general rule of face-to-face confrontation was the necessity to
protect children, not the necessity to admit all reliable evidence. In fact, the majority
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opinion mentions trauma and its variants more than twice as many times (19) as it
mentions reliable and its variants (9).
Constitutional guarantees are not absolute, even when cast in categorical terms.
For example, even Justice Scalia recognizes an exception to the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press for obscene and "sexually provocative"
publications. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,83132 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, he joined the majority opinion in
Osborne, which, in a First Amendment context, declared that "a State's interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling."
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Justice Scalia has
similarly acknowledged a possible Confrontation Clause exception for dying
declarations. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n.6.
Because Craig's primary rationale was to advance the societal interest in
protecting

children—a

goal that even Justice Scalia shares in other

contexts —assuming that Craig was swept away in the tide that toppled Ohio v.
Roberts is a grave error, and one that no appellate court has yet made.
D. A lower court lacks discretion to infer that the Supreme Court
overruled itself, but must apply the more relevant precedent
The State's opening brief cited Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,237 (1997), for the
proposition that '"[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
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appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court]
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions/" Id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989)).
Defendant responds by distinguishing Agostini on its facts. See Br. R.P.I, at 3739. He argues that" [i]n contrast to Agostini, Craig does not directly control this case
because it did not analyze Utah's rule." Id. at 38. He also argues that "the question
in Agostini was whether there had even been a change in the law that would allow
a lower court to overturn a Supreme Court decision that was directly on pont." Id. 38
(emphasis). On the contrary, there are no circumstances that "would allow a lower
court to overturn a Supreme Court decision." Id. Only the Supreme Court can
overturn Supreme Court precedent. This rule is well settled law not tied to the
particular facts of Agostini or any other case. See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230,
1237 (2005) (quoting Rodriguez)', American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S.
167,180 (1990) (same).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went so far as to state,
"We may not reject, dismiss, disregard, or deny Supreme Court precedent, even if,
in a particular case, it seems pellucidly clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court
judges alike that, given the opportunity, the Supreme Court would overrule its

19

precedent/' Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720,722 (5th Cir. 1996). Such an anticipatory
overruling has been called "an indefensible brand of judicial activism." Rodriguez,
490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The State is not insisting that this Court "blindly follow the analysis used in
Craig," Br. R.P.I, at 37, any more than defendant is insisting that this Court blindly
follow the analysis used in Crawford. The State is merely asking this Court to
consider both precedents and, as it would normally do, follow the one that more
directly applies. Crawford involved admission at trial of the tape-recorded statement
of an adult who did not testify. Craig involved a child witness who testified at trial
via closed-circuit television. As defendant rightly observes, Utah's criminal rule 15.5
differs slightly from the Maryland rule at issue in Craig. See Br. R.P.I, at 38. But, like
Craig and unlike Crawford, the case at bar involves a child witness testifying by
closed circuit television.
To disregard Craig on the basis of defendant's argument—that "Crawford
plainly rejected Craig's approach"—would be to engage in the very "judicial
activism" that the Supreme Court forbids. Br. R.P.I, at 37; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 486
(Stevens, J., dissenting). This is especially true here, where it is far from "pellucidly
clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court judges alike that, given the opportunity,
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the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent/7 Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722. On the
contrary, no court other than the trial court here has even suggested it.
E.

This Court should remand for further proceedings consistent
with Craig.

Defendant contends that "even if Craig remained good law after Crawford,
reversal of the trial court's order is not required in this case where the trial court has
not made the requisite findings of necessity/7 Br. R.P.L at 45.
Defendant is correct that the trial did not make the requisite Craig findings
below. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-856; State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 58,28 P.3d 1278
(quoting Craig). Having wrongly decided that Craig was overruled and therefore
had no application, the court had no reason to make Craig findings. See R. 258; Br.
Pet. at 13-16. The State also agrees that "it cannot ask this Court to assume the trial
court would make findings based on a consideration of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the state." Br. R.P.I, at 47.
However, it does not follow that "dispensing with face to face confrontation
would violate the Sixth Amendment even if Craig applied/' Id.
The record contains ample evidence to support the Craig findings. Dr. Miles
concluded in her report that "Megan has the capacity to provide reliable testimony
to the extent her emotional trauma can be reduced. However, if Megan were
required to testify before her father, it is unlikely that she would be willing to
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disclose the alleged abuse/7 R. 246-47. She stated that "Megan has witnessed her
father's violence, threats, and anger, and she is fearful for her own safety as well as
that of her mother. Megan's fear of her father is highly likely to block her ability to
think rationally and to express herself coherently, if she would talk at all." Id.
Requiring Megan to testify before her father "would likely undermine the progress
that she has made to date in treatment, and would further traumatize her." Id.
Dr. Miles testified at the hearing that, with respect to Megan's ability to testify
outside the presence of defendant, "to the degree that the emotional trauma can be
minimized,... I think that she's going to be able to do that." R. 267:23-24. She also
testified, "I think that if she is required to testify in court—in this setting, in the
presence of her father—that her anxiety and fear will just block her ability to even
kind of answer the questions . . ." R. 267: 38. She concluded that "not only would
it incapacitate her in this setting, I think the impact afterwards will also be very — it's
going to take her longer to recover and reach some more normal emotional plane."
Id.
Based on this evidence, a court may reasonably conclude, and indeed might
have no alternative but to conclude, (1) that the closed circuit television procedure
is necessary to protect Megan's welfare; (2) that Megan would be traumatized, not
by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant, and (3) that the
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emotional distress Megan would suffer in defendant's presence is more than mere
nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56;
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 58,28 P.31278 (quoting Craig).
Fortunately, this case is in an interlocutory posture. Therefore, the appropriate
course is to remand with instructions to the trial court to make appropriate findings
on the Craig factors and to ensure compliance with rule 15.5(2), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
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